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State Court Attempts to Limit the Applicability
of the Federal Arbitration Act in a
Post-Lopez World
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a contract for the construction of a small, single family
home. The homebuyers are and always have been Alabama residents.
The architect, general contractor, and all other workers are and always
have been Alabama residents. All of the building materials are from
Alabama. Now, imagine that the construction contract, which was
signed by all of the parties, contains an arbitration clause providing that
all disputes arising out of the contract are subject to arbitration in accor-
dance with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).' Then, the inevitable
occurs. The homebuyers are dissatisfied with the home and file suit
against the general contractor, who moves to stay the proceedings pend-
ing arbitration. Will the court apply the FAA?
The answer depends on the jurisdiction in which the case is
decided. Here, because the case is in Alabama, the court would proba-
bly not force the application of the FAA. Furthermore, the court is
unlikely to subject the dispute to arbitration at all because Alabama
law,2 which would apply in the absence of preempting federal law, does
not enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements.' This is not necessarily
how the case would be resolved if the case were to reach the United
States Supreme Court.
Seemingly, lower courts use one of three approaches when discuss-
ing the constraints of the Commerce Clause on the applicability of the
FAA: (1) the "Affects Approach"; (2) the "Substantially Affects
Approach;" or (3) the "Three Categories of Commerce Approach."4 The
second and third categories are where it appears that certain state courts,
typically hostile to arbitration, use United States v. Lopez5 as a tactic to
circumvent the FAA. Although many state courts correctly realize that
Lopez applies to all cases involving the federal government's regulation
of an interstate activity that affects commerce, most opinions citing
1. 9 U.S.C §§ 1-14 (2002).
2. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993).
3. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258,1260 (Ala. 1994).
4. Compare L & L Kampwood Assoc. v. Omega Builders, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 125, 126 (Tex.
1999), with Am. Gen. Fin. v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 738 (Ala. 2000), and Sisters of the Visitation v.
Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d (Ala. 2000).
5. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Lopez tend to overestimate the Supreme Court's intent to place limits on
the Commerce Clause. That overestimation results in a tactic used by
state courts to circumvent arbitration agreements.
This Comment seeks first to suggest that there are three approaches
employed by state courts in determining the effect of the Commerce
Clause on the FAA. Further, this Comment seeks to illuminate the ways
in which various state courts use Lopez to circumvent the FAA. In addi-
tion, the Comment predicts the outcome of such cases if the Supreme
Court were to decide them.
II. THE LIMITS IMPOSED By LOPEZ
a. United States v. Lopez
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,6 holding, for the first the first time in half a century,7
that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority.8 The law made
it a federal offense for "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone."9 The Court began its analysis with a discussion of feder-
alism, noting that "the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." 10 This strong
statement foreshadowed the Justices' conclusion in the case, as such
strong rhetoric is generally reserved to cases that are clearly out of Con-
gress's reach.
The Court then addressed the definition of "commerce."' 1 The
Constitution states that Congress has the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 2 In Gibbons v. Ogden, 3 the Court first defined "commerce,"
stating, "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it
is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
6. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
7. The last time the Supreme Court invalidated a law based on Congress exceeding its
Commerce Clause authority was in 1936. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. Lopez, a twelfth grade student, was charged with violating the
federal law for carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun into Edison High School in San Antonio,
Texas. Id. at 551.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1990).
10. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 529, 552 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at
292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)).
! 1. Id. at 553.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 189-90 (1824).
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rules for carrying on that intercourse."' 4 Moreover, the commerce
power "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution."' 5
The constitutional limitations placed on the Commerce Clause are
the very limitations that the Lopez Court tried to define. The Court
stated that the Commerce Clause power extends to three categories of
commerce. I6 If a law does not fall into one of the three categories, then
Congress has exceeded its Commerce Clause power. The three catego-
ries are: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce;
and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce." In examing the third category, the Court clarified its position
by stating that a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce is
required.' 8
Looking at the law struck down in Lopez, it is clear that guns on
school property do not substantially affect interstate commerce.1 9 How-
ever, the inquiry is not so simple for cases involving arbitration agree-
ments. Because the law struck down in Lopez was so clearly not a
regulation of interstate commerce, some commentators felt that the
Lopez decision was the equivalent of a warning shot to the legislature.20
Subsequent decisions demonstrate the Court's intention to limit Com-
merce Clause powers. One such decision is United States v. Morrison.2 '
b. United States v. Morrison
In Morrison, the Court declared unconstitutional the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). 22 That Act, passed under Con-
14. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 533 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824)).
15. Id. at 558-59.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 559.
19. But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. See generally Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wiskirchen, Great Expectations: The Illusion
of Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 22 J. LEGIS. 241 (1996).
21. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
22. Id. at 605. In Morrison, Christy Brzonkala, a Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University (Virginia Tech) student, alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford assaulted
and repeatedly raped her. Id. at 602. She also claimed that she subsequently became severely
emotionally disturbed and depressed. Id. at 602-03. After a series of poorly handled University
hearings which ultimately resulted in Morrison's punishment being set aside by the senior vice
president and provost of the University, Brzonkala dropped out of the University. Id. at 604. She
later sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech alleging that the attack violated the Violence
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gress's Commerce Clause power, states that "persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated
by gender."23 The Act also provides victims with a choice of forum and
broad civil remedies.24
In Lopez, the Supreme Court discussed Congress's failure to insert
a jurisdictional element that would make it clear that Congress intended
to pass the Gun-Free School Zones Act under its Commerce Clause
authority.25 VAWA, however, did contain a jurisdictional element.26
Although the Supreme Court found the statute's jurisdictional element
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause, the
Court noted Congress's lip service to the Commerce Clause.2 7 Never-
theless, the FAA does contain a specific jurisdictional hook linking the
law to the Commerce Clause. The law states that it applies to maritime
contracts or contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce. "28
The question then becomes whether each of the cases in which the FAA
is involved evidences "a transaction involving commerce." Most likely,
the Supreme Court would answer "yes."
Although the Court did strike down VAWA based on a violation of
the Commerce Clause, this case, like Lopez, was an extreme situation
where interstate commerce was not involved. The Court has never
struck down a law that appeared to address even the least form of com-
merce. In fact, the opposite is true. Where an activity affects interstate
commerce, even in the aggregate, the Court has not denied Congress the
power to regulate that activity. 9
c. Wickard v. Filburn
Wickard v. Filburn is an example of the Supreme Court evaluating
the aggregate effects of an activity.30 There, the Supreme Court held
Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1999), and that Virginia Tech's actions violated Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688).
23. Id. at 605.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
26. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (2000).
27. Id. In a separate section of the act, the legislature stated that the law "creates a federal
criminal remedy to punish interstate crimes of abuse[,] including crimes committed by spouses or
intimate partners during interstate travel and crimes committed by spouses or intimate partners
who cross State lines to continue the abuse." Id.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
29. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
30. See id. In Wickard, a farmer who had for many years grown wheat for sale and for his
own use, was fined because he exceeded the number of acres that could be farmed under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Id. at 114. The farmer disputed the fine, arguing that
because the wheat was grown for his private consumption, it did not affect interstate commerce
and, therefore, Congress did not have the power to regulate it. Id. at 118.
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that even though the activity in question was purely local in character,
the aggregate effects of the activity affected interstate commerce.3 The
Court used the term "substantial" fifty-three years before the Lopez deci-
sion, stating, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce .... "32
III. ALLIED-BRUCE AND THE "FULLEST EXTENT" OF COMMERCE
a. History of "Commerce" in Supreme Court FAA Cases
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.," the Supreme Court faced the
question of whether the FAA applied in state courts. The Court circum-
vented the issue, holding that it need not decide that point because the
contract in question did not "evidence commerce," and thus was not
subject to the FAA.34 Hence, long before Lopez, Bernhardt held that the
FAA cannot rightly be enforced unless the Commerce Clause is satis-
fied. Therefore, the Lopez requirements ought to apply to all FAA
cases.
In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,35 the
Supreme Court addressed how federal courts were to "conduct them-
selves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has
power to legislate," i.e., interstate commerce.36 The Court stated, "it is
clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over inter-
31. Id. at 119-20.
32. Id. at 125.
33. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Bernhardt involved a dispute between a former New York resident
and his New York employer with whom he had an employment contract containing an arbitration
clause. Id. at 199. The case was removed from a Vermont court to a federal court on diversity
grounds. Id.
34. Id. at 201.
35. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). There Prima Paint bought Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. Id.
at 397. The sales agreement stated that the parties agreed to arbitrate "[a]ny controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof." Id. at 397-98. The parties also
agreed that Flood & Conklin would advise Prima Paint as to "formulae, manufacturing operations,
sales, and servicing of Prima Trade Sales accounts." Id.
Soon after the first payment was due, Prima Paint accused Flood & Conklin of breaching
both the consulting agreement and the earlier purchase agreement. Id. at 398. In response, Prima
Paint argued that Flood & Conklin had fraudulently represented its solvency and ability to
perform its contractual obligations. Id. Prima Paint filed a complaint with the federal district
court and contemporaneously moved to stay any arbitration. Id. Thereafter, Flood & Conklin
moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. Id. at 398-99. The district court granted Flood
& Conklin's motion to stay the action and the Second Circuit dismissed Prima Paint's appeal,
holding that the contract in question did evidence a transaction involving interstate commerce. Id.
at 399.
36. See id. at 405.
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state commerce and over admiralty.' , In determining that Congress
passed the act under its Commerce Clause power, the Court relied on
both House and Senate reports. In particular, the Court relied on the
statement that the proposed law "only affects contracts relating to inter-
state subjects and contracts in admiralty."38 The Court also relied on the
Senate report, which stated that the bill "relates to maritime transactions
and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce."39 Therefore, after
Prima Paint, it was clear that Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its
constitutional authority to regulate commerce. Accordingly, under the
Supremacy Clause, states are bound to enforce the FAA where it is in
conflict with a state's own arbitration laws.4°
In addition, the Court noted that Congress passed the FAA in
response to the states' unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements.
The Court also spoke about the old common law hostility to arbitration
and the fact that many state arbitration laws failed to make arbitration
agreements enforceable.4' Clearly, the Court wanted to force the states
to recognize the FAA.42
b. Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Supreme Court
addressed what Congress meant by the phrase "involving commerce,"
when it stated that the FAA applied to contracts "evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce."43 The facts in Allied-Bruce revolve around a
termite control contract that contained an arbitration clause.4 4 The Dob-
sons were homeowners who had a contract with the Terminix Company
for pest control in their home.45 When the Dobsons discovered exten-
37. Id.
38. 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (citing Congressman Graham, the bill's sponsor).
39. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924).
40. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Southland Corp. v. Keating is
a perfect example of this principle. In that case, convenience store franchisees brought suit
against the franchisor alleging fraud, breach of contract, and violation of disclosure requirements
of the California Franchise Investment Law. Id. at 3-4. The California Court of Appeal reversed
the lower court's refusal to compel arbitration of the appellees' claims under California's
Franchise Investment Law. Id. at 5. The court of appeals held that if the Franchise Investment
Law rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unenforceable, it would conflict with
the FAA and would therefore be invalid under the Supremacy ClAuse. Id. The California
Supreme Court, however, held that the California statute required judicial consideration of claims
brought under the state statute and refused to enforce the parties' arbitration contract. Id. The
United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 6.
41. See id. at 13-14.
42. Id. at 10.
43. 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995).
44. Id. at 268.
45. Id.
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sive termite infestation and damage, they brought suit.46 Terminix
moved to stay the case pending arbitration.47 Its motion was denied.48
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed based on an Alabama statute,
ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), that made written, predispute arbitration
agreements unenforceable. 49 In doing so, it was necessary for the Ala-
bama Supreme Court to find that the FAA did not apply to the state
contract.5 ° The court accomplished this by finding that the connection
between the termite contract and interstate commerce was too slight.51
The Supreme Court clarified the phrase "involving commerce,"
stating that the words are "broader than the often-found words of art 'in
commerce.'"52 "Involving commerce" "therefore cover[s] more than
'only persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce."'
The Court concluded that "involving" is broad and is the functional
equivalent of "affecting." This is significant because the phrase "affect-
ing commerce" usually signals Congress's intent to exercise its Com-
merce Clause powers to its fullest extent.54 The Supreme Court,
therefore, held that the FAA applied and reversed the holding of the
Alabama Supreme Court. The effects of this seemingly local contract
were substantial enough for the Supreme Court to apply federal law
under the Commerce Clause.
IV. THREE APPROACHES TO THE FAA AFTER LOPEZ
Since the Allied-Bruce and Lopez cases, it appears that lower courts
use essentially three different approaches in analyzing the FAA's
"involving commerce" language. One approach, the "Affects
Approach," does not consider the Lopez case relevant to the FAA's com-
merce language. Another approach, the "Substantially Affects
Approach," correctly incorporates Lopez's requirement that any law
passed by Congress under its commerce power must regulate an activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce. The third approach, the
"Three Categories of Commerce Approach," encompasses the "Substan-
tially Affects Approach" and recognizes it as one of three areas in which
Congress may legislate under its commerce power. Those three catego-






52. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
53. Id. (citing United States v. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975)).
54. 513 U.S. at 273.
55. Id.
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ries are: (1) instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things
in interstate commerce; (2) use of channels of interstate commerce; or
(3) conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.56
a. The Affects Approach
Some state courts require only that an effect on interstate commerce
occur to apply for the FAA. The error in this approach is not the out-
come, but the method. Without the satisfaction of one of the other two
categories discussed in Lopez, Congress may not regulate where there is
only an effect on commerce; 57 instead, there must be a substantial effect
on commerce.
The majority of cases decided under the Affects Approach
make no mention whatsoever of Lopez. Most merely require "an
effect on" or "nexus with" interstate commerce. The Affects Ap-
proach is the favored approach in South Carolina,58 Maine,59
56. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
57. See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
58. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs. 553 S.E.2d 110 (S.C. 2001). The South Carolina
Supreme Court employed the "Affects Approach" as late as 2001. In Zabinski, the court
examined the facts and determined that interstate commerce was involved. Id. at 117. The court
did not analyze or even mention the Lopez standard. See generally Zabinski, 553 S.E.2d 110.
Bright Acres Association was a partnership consisting of four equal partners. Id. at 112. The
partners created the association to buy, renovate, and sell thirty apartments and approximately
twenty-six acres of land. Id. The partnership agreement provided for arbitration in the case of
claims or controversies arising out of the agreement. Id. at 112-13. After one of the partners died,
another partner bought the deceased's twenty-five percent share. Id. at 113. A controversy arose
out of the purchase and the two other partners filed an action seeking arbitration, which the fifty
percent partner opposed. Id.
The South Carolina Supreme Court required arbitration after finding that the partnership was
engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 117. The court stated that in order for them to "ascertain
whether a transaction involves commerce within the meaning of the FAA, the court must examine
the agreement, the complaint and the surrounding facts." Id. The court emphasized that: (1) the
partners purchased the land from an out of state owner; (2) Bright Acres financed the purchase
through an out-of-state Bank; (3) Bright Acres used several out-of-state subcontractors; and (4)
the partners advertised their development across state lines. Id. at 117-18.
59. See Saga Communs. of New England, Inc. v. Voornas, 756 A.2d 954 (Me. 2000). In
Saga, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine faced the choice of "interstate commerce" applications
and chose the Affects Approach. Id. at 958-59.
Lori Voomas signed an employment agreement to work for Saga as an on-air radio
announcer and co-host of a morning radio show. Id. at 956. The employment contract contained
an arbitration clause and a non-compete clause by which Voornas was precluded from performing
on-air services for any competing radio station within a seventy-five-mile radius. Id. Voomas left
Saga and soon after began working for Citadel Communications Corporation, a company that
owned several radio stations that competed with Saga. Id. at 956-57. Even though Voomas did
not immediately return to the air, Saga filed suit to invoke the arbitration clause soon after
learning of Voomas's new employment. Id. at 957.
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the arbitration clause should be upheld because the
employment contract affected interstate commerce. Id. at 959. Similar to the South Carolina
court in Zabinski, the Voornas court looked at the facts to determine that there was an effect on
1058
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Missouri,60 Louisiana,6 Colorado,62 and Oklahoma.63
interstate commerce. The court relied heavily on the fact that Voornas was a radio announcer. Id.
The court does not explain why being a radio announcer affects interstate commerce, rather, the
court simply states that it does. Id.
60. See Duggan v. Zip Mail Servs., Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). Soon after the
Lopez decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri decided
Duggan. There, Dennis Duggan entered into an employment contract with Zip Mail, a mail
presort service, to be a sales representative in its St. Louis office. Id. at 201. The employment
agreement contained an arbitration clause. Id. at 201-02. Zip Mail fired Duggan, who
subsequently filed suit against Zip Mail, alleging civil conspiracy arising out of his termination,
intentional interference with a contract, misrepresentation, defamation, and breach of contract. Id.
at 202. Zip Mail moved to compel arbitration. Id.
The court cited Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson for the proposition that the FAA
should reach the full extent of Congress's Commerce Clause power and that "involving
commerce" is the functional equivalent of "affecting commerce." Id. The court did not, however,
examine what "affecting commerce" means in light of Lopez. After stating the Allied-Bruce
holding, the court looked back at federal cases that were decided before Allied-Bruce or Lopez.
See generally Duggan, 920 S.W.2d 200. The court then stated that the contract involved interstate
commerce "in that the mail which Zip Mail sorted crossed state lines, the U.S. Postal System was
the final destination of mail presorted by Zip Mail, and plaintiffs position involved dealing with
customers in Illinois, as well as Missouri." Id. at 202.
61. See Alford v. Johnson Rice & Co., 773 So. 2d 255, 258 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000). The
Alford reasoning is similar to the reasoning used in Zip Mail. The court began its Commerce
Clause analysis by stating the holding in Allied-Bruce, and then relied on cases decided before
Allied-Bruce, and Lopez. See generally Alford, 773 So. 2d 255.
The Alfords opened an account with the stock brokerage firm of Johnson and Rice and its
employee-broker. Id. at 257. The employee-broker requested that the Alfords execute two
documents that the company required to complete the transaction. Id. One of the documents
contained an arbitration agreement. Id. at 3. After a dispute arose and the Alfords filed suit,
Johnson and Rice moved to compel arbitration. Id. at 4. Upon deciding that interstate commerce
was involved, the court simply enforced the arbitration agreement. Id. at 259.
62. Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Health Servs., 960 P.2d 722, 724 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). In
Grohn, Carol Grohn a clinical coordinator, filed a wrongful termination of employment action
against Sisters of Charity Health Services of Colorado. Id. at 724. Her employment contract
contained an arbitration clause and Grohn's former employer moved to compel arbitration. Id.
The trial court held that the arbitration clause could not be enforced. Id. In finding that the
arbitration agreement should be enforced, the Colorado Court of Appeals committed the same
mistake as the courts in Louisiana, Missouri, and Maine. The court listed some of the language
from Allied-Bruce and then referred to cases that were decided before both Allied-Bruce and
Lopez. See generally Grohn, 960 P.2d 722. In one such case, the Colorado court cited a pre-
Lopez New Jersey case for the idea that the "involving commerce" requirement is not "a rigorous
inquiry." Id. at 725. The court further cited the New Jersey case for the proposition that "the
contract need have only the slightest nexus with interstate commerce." Id. The court then
dismissed the fact that the business at issue here involved out-of-state advertising, treating out-of-
state patients, receiving payments for out-of-state insurers, and receiving goods from vendors
located outside the state. Id. at 726. Based on these facts, the court decided to enforce the FAA.
Id.
63. See Towe, Hester & Erwin v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 594, 596
(Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
In Towe, an insurance agency sued a group of affiliated non-resident insurance companies
alleging that the companies forced the business owners to sign a "Rehabilitation Program"
agreement under threat of immediate termination of the agency agreement. Id. Additionally, the
agency argued that the program was not part of nor subject to the arbitration clause in the original
1059
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Some states blatantly defy the Lopez decision. In L & L Kempwood
Associates, L.P. v. Omega Builders, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court spe-
cifically addressed the Lopez decision. 64  There, the court of appeals
denied mandamus relief, holding that the FAA was inapplicable because
there was no substantial effect on interstate commerce involved, as
required by Lopez.6 5 Before the Supreme Court of Texas, Kempwood,
the appellant, argued that Lopez did not restrict the Allied-Bruce case.66
The court agreed, resting its decision on the fact that Lopez did not refer
to Allied-Bruce or in any way suggest that the United States Supreme
Court had changed its view of "Congress's commerce power over eco-
nomic activities. 67
Many Texas cases facially rely on Kempwood,68 while other cases
use similar reasoning without citing the Kempwood decision.69 Many
lower courts in Texas require only that a transaction involve interstate
commerce for the FAA to apply.7° Surprisingly, many of the courts that
did not rely on Kempwood did not find that the transaction in their
respective case involved interstate commerce.7' Moreover, the courts
did so without requiring a substantial effect, a much higher hurdle.72
b. The Substantially Affects Approach
Many state courts correctly require a substantial effect on interstate
commerce to enforce arbitration clauses under the FAA; 73 however,
these courts often require that the effect on commerce be more "substan-
Agency Agreement. Id. The non-resident insurance company filed two applications to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration, one of which was filed pursuant to the FAA. Id. at 596.
The Oklahoma court did not even consider what "affects interstate commerce." It simply
stated that the business relationship between the parties was interstate in character and therefore
affected interstate commerce. Id. at 597. The business in Towe was an insurance agency. Id. at
595.
64. 9 S.W.3d 125, 126 (Tex. 1999).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 127.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., In re Educ. Mgmt. Corp. v. The Art Inst. of Houston, 14 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000); In re Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 19 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); In re John
Profanchik, 31 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); In re Valle Redondo, 47 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2001).
69. See, e.g., Associated Air Freight v. Meek, 67 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App. Mar. 8, 2001),
Shelter Props. v. STTI Const. & Stabilizing Tech. of Texas, Inc., No. 04-00-00839-DV, 2001 WL
224988 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 2001), and In re Southwest Lodging, No. 08-01-00072-CV, 2001 WL
636930 (Tex. App. June 7, 2001).
70. See id.
71. See id. But see Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. McCoy, 944 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997).
72. McCoy, 944 S.W.2d 720.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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tial" than the Supreme Court has required." These state courts often use
the Lopez decision as a technique to circumvent the national policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements.75 Texas76 and Alabama77 use this
technique most frequently, though Tennessee 78 has employed the
approach as well.
Alabama, a state historically hostile to arbitration,79 frequently uses
this technique, along with the Three Categories of Commerce
Approach.8" For example, Alabama courts have used this approach in
finding no substantial effect on interstate commerce in cases involving
construction projects,8' the purchase and financing of an automo-
74. See, e.g., Russ Berrie & Co. v. Gantt, 998 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App. 1999).
75. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2.
76. Many Texas Courts of Appeals have found that a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is required in order for the FAA to apply. For example, in Russ Berrie & Co. v. Gantt,
998 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App. 1999), an employee, Gantt, sued his former employer for violation of
the Texas Labor Code after Russ Berrie fired Gantt. Id. at 716. Gantt's employment contract
contained an arbitration agreement that Russ Berrie moved to enforce after Gantt filed the action.
Id. The court quickly came to the conclusion, without much discussion, that Lopez requires that
the activity at issue substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 715. The court held that the
FAA did not apply where Gantt's employment contract was at-will, was not specific as to any out-
of-state travel that may be required, and was devoid of information regarding the volume of
business conducted by Gantt. Id.
In Ikon Office Solutions v. Eifert, 2 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App. 1999), the former owner of a
business, Eifert, sued the purchaser of the business, IKON, for breach of contract, fraud, tortious
interference, and conspiracy. id. at 690-91. IKON moved to compel arbitration according to the
sales contract. Id. at 691. The court found that arbitration was inappropriate because the movants
failed to present adequate evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 696.
In re Turner Bros. Trucking Co. involved a personal injury suit by an employee against his
employer. 8 S.W.3d at 372-73 (Tex. App. 1999). The court used Lopez as a natural
accompaniment to the Allied-Bruce decision. Id. at 374-75. It recognized the contradiction in the
Texas courts' holdings and held that the movant had the burden to show that the transaction had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 375-76.
77. See, e.g., Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1989).
78. See Frizzel Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg, L.L.C., 9 S.W.3d 79, 81-84 (Tenn. 1999). Here, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee required that the transaction substantially affect interstate commerce,
as described in Lopez. Id. at 83. The court found that out-of-state contractors participated in the
construction of a hotel, nine employees were from another state, at least seven multistate vendors
supplied materials for the hotel, and out of state corporations insured and issued payment
performance bonds on the project. Id. at 83. Based on these facts, the court held that the
transaction substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. See also Berkley v. H & R Block E.
Tax Servs., Inc., 30 S.W.3d 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
79. See, e.g., Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated
Alabama's Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 581-82 (1996).
80. See, e.g., Robert Frank McAlpine Architecture, Inc. v. Heilpern, 712 So. 2d 738 (Ala.
1998).
81. See Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So. 2d 869, 870-72 (Ala. 1999). In Rogers,
a husband and wife brought a suit against the contractor that they hired to repair their chimney.
Id. at 870. The contractor moved to compel arbitration per an arbitration clause contained within
the work contract. Id. The court found that there was no substantial effect on interstate
commerce, therefore, the FAA did not apply. Id. at 872. This was true despite a clause within the
contract that stated that both parties acknowledged that the work performed involved or affected
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bile,8 2 the purchase and financing of a home, 83 and employment
interstate commerce. Id. The court stated that such a recitation did not prove that the involvement
of or effect on interstate commerce was substantial. Id.
In Brown v. Dewitt, Frank Brown, an Alabama resident, sued Dewitt, Inc., an Alabama
corporation, for breach of a Preconstruction Purchase and Escrow Agreement for the sale of a
condominium. 808 So. 2d 11, 12 (Ala. 2001). That agreement contained an arbitration clause. Id.
After Brown filed suit, the circuit court granted Dewitt's motion to dismiss. Id. at 13. In
dismissing the motion, the court stated that a substantial effect on interstate commerce is
necessary to compel arbitration. Id. at 15.
The Alabama Supreme Court analyzed the case using the five-factor test found in Sisters of
Visitation v. Cochran. Id. The court quickly determined that the only factor at issue was the fifth
factor: the degree of separability from other contracts. Id. at 14. The degree of interstate
commerce involved in a disputed contract does not determine whether the transaction at issue
substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 15. However, if a court finds that the transaction
in dispute would disrupt performance of related contracts or activities that would be subject to the
FAA, then the interstate commerce involved in the related contracts should be given more weight.
Id. at 16.
Here, Dewitt argued that a title-insurance policy had been issued by a California corporation
for the condominium and that Dewitt marketed the condominiums in interstate commerce. Id. at
14-15. Dewitt supported the second argument with evidence that an out-of-state party purchased
one of the condominiums. Id. at 15. The court determined that the sale of the condominium to an
out-of-state party was unrelated and did not create the necessary effect on interstate commerce
required to compel arbitration under the FAA. Id. at 15. As for the out-of-state title insurance
provider, the court held that any effect of such an out of state connection is negligible. Id. at 15-
16.
82. See Tefco Fin. v. Green, 793 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2001). There, Pamela Green, a car buyer,
sued Tefco Finance, her financing company, when Tefco charged Green an additional twenty
dollars per month after Green had the car repaired. Id. at 756. Green alleged fraud, fraudulent
suppression, breach of contract, and negligence. Id. at 756-57. Tefco moved to compel
arbitration under the retail installment contract and security agreement. Id. at 757. The court
relied on Lopez and Morrison and asked whether the aggregate effects of the transaction
substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 759. The court held that the movant did not
satisfy its burden because Tefco presented no evidence of how the purchase of a used automobile
affects interstate commerce. Id. at 759-60. The court did not place much importance on the fact
that the car was manufactured out of state and that it inherently is capable of crossing state lines.
Id. at 760.
83. See Ex parte Learakos, No. 1000244, 2001 WL 792787 (Ala. 2002). Ex parte Learakos
involved a suit by a homebuyer, Learakos, against an internet brokerage company, ERA
Class.Com; one of the brokerage company's agents, Connie Olsen; and the seller of the home,
Also Bernabo. Id. at * I. Learakos alleged breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresentation,
fraudulent suppression, conspiracy to defraud, and negligence or wantonness. Id. The
homeowner listed the home for sale in Alabama, the internet selling company is an Alabama
franchise of a New Jersey company, and an Alabama bank financed the purchase of the home. Id.
at **1-2. Learakos paid one thousand dollars in earnest money from a bank account in Illinois.
Id. at *2. The purchase agreement signed by the buyer contained an arbitration agreement. Id. at
* 1. The selling company moved to compel that agreement after Learakos filed suit. Id.
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the New Jersey franchise headquarters were collateral
to the contract between Learakos and Class.Com. Id. at *3. The court also held that the Illinois
withdrawal and payment to an Alabama company did not establish a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Id. Here, the court held that because the FAA's substantial effect on
interstate commerce requirement was not met, the court could not properly apply the FAA. Id. at
*4. Rather, Alabama law should apply to prohibit specific enforcement of "an agreement to
submit a controversy to arbitration." Id. (citing ALA. CODE §8-1-41(3) (1975)). The Supreme
Court of Alabama vacated the lower court's order to arbitrate. Id.
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disputes.84
Even though the state usually tries to circumvent the FAA, there is
at least one case where the Alabama Supreme Court held that a party
met the state's high "substantial" effects requirement. In American Gen-
eral Finance v. Branch, the Supreme Court of Alabama decided a case
brought by borrowers against a loan company. 85 The court noted the
following pertinent facts: American General Finance was a large, multi-
national corporation with its headquarters in Indiana; American General
was associated with many other out of state corporations; and the loan
was inherently mobile, which enabled Branch to purchase goods and
services that traveled in interstate commerce.86 The court found that a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is required to apply the FAA,87
and that, under the facts of this case, there was no such effect.
V. THE THREE CATEGORIES OF COMMERCE APPROACH
The Three Categories of Commerce Approach is a variation on the
Substantially Affects Approach. Courts using this approach correctly
state the rule,88 although they very often misapply it. The problem
arises when courts apply this test too stringently. For instance, overly
stringent application has been used in cases involving construction in
84. See Ex parte Ephraim, 806 So. 2d 352 (Ala. 2001). In Ephraim, Flora Ephraim sued
Tenet Healthcare Corporation ("Tenet"), her former employer, claiming retaliatory discharge. Id.
at 353. After suffering an on-the-job injury, Ephraim claimed that Tenet refused to reimburse her
for medical costs related to her injury, refused to pay her weekly benefits during her recovery, and
refused to reinstate her when she was capable of returning to work. Id. Ephraim received an
employee handbook and signed an Employee Acknowledgement Form, which stated that she
voluntarily agreed to submit to "final and binding arbitration" regarding claims and disputes
relating in any way to employment or the termination of employment with Tenet. Id. at 353-54.
The lower court compelled arbitration. Id. at 354-55.
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court held that Tenet had to prove that the employment
contract had a substantial effect on interstate commerce in order to apply the FAA. Id. at 356.
Regardless of Ephraim's signing of the arbitration agreement, the court held that because Tenet
did not present evidence indicating that its employment contract with Ephraim substantially
affected interstate commerce, the motion to compel arbitration was improperly granted. Id. at
358.
85. 793 So. 2d. 738 (Ala. 2001).
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 747.
88. The rule, as previously stated, allows Congress to regulate three categories of commerce:
(1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce. See, e.g., City of Cut Bank v. Tom Patrick Constr., Inc., 963 P.2d 1283
(Mont. 1998).
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Montana89 and Alabama, 90 the purchase of real estate, 9' and employ-
89. City of Cut Bank v. Tom Patrick Constr., 963 P.2d 1283 (Mont. 1998). There, Cut Bank
argued that its arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the contract containing the
agreement did not involve interstate commerce. Id. at 1284. When Tom Patrick Construction did
not complete the construction project in the way that City of Cut Bank wanted, Cut Bank hired
another company to finish the job and refused to surrender Tom Patrick Construction's bond and
performance bond. Id. Tom Patrick began the process of arbitrating the dispute, and Cut Bank
objected. Id.
The district court held that the matter involved interstate commerce and denied Cut Bank's
complaint seeking a stay of arbitration. Id. On appeal, Cut Bank argued that the case was purely
local and that it did not involve interstate commerce. Id. The Supreme Court of Montana held
that the district court incorrectly dismissed the complaint because when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the undisputed facts showed that the construction project was a local
transaction that did not involve interstate commerce. Id.
The present court first recited the three categories from Lopez in which Congress can regulate
commerce. Id. at 1286. The court determined that the only category where this transaction had a
possibility of falling was the "substantially affects interstate commerce" category. Id. at 1286.
The court focused on the following facts: (1) Cut bank was a municipal corporation created and
existing pursuant to Montana law; (2) Tom Patrick Construction is a corporation chartered in
Montana with its principal place of business in that state: and (3) the construction project was to
be performed in Montana. Id. at 1287.
90. See Robert Frank McAlpine Architecture, Inc. v. Heilpern, 712 So. 2d 738 (Ala. 1998).
In Heilpern, homeowners William and Lauda Heilpem sued Robert Frank McAlpine Architecture,
Inc. for breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and conspiracy related to the remodeling of their
house. Id. at 739. The contract that governed the agreement between the Heilperns and McAlpine
contained an arbitration clause. Id. The Heilperns specified certain appliances, plumbing fixtures,
lighting fixtures, and so forth for use in the remodeling project that McAlpine could only get from
out-of-state suppliers. Id. McAlpine had the items shipped from various states to Alabama for
use in the project. Id.
Dissatisfied with the work done on their house, the Heilperns sued both the architectural firm
and the contractor's firm. Id. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
Id. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the architectural firm was not engaged in the
interstate transport of goods where it purchased out of state materials and shipped them into
Alabama for use on the Heilpern's project. Id. at 790.
In Kainpis v. Yarbrough, Kampis, an Alabama resident, sued Yarbrough, an Alabama
corporation, after they contracted for the construction of a new house in Alabama. Kampis v.
Yarbrough, No. 1000099, 2002 WL 228047, at *1 (Ala. Feb. 8, 2002). The contract contained an
arbitration agreement. Id. After closing on the house, Kampis discovered many defects in the
construction of the house for which he brought suit for negligent or wanton construction or design,
breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of fitness, workmanship, and habitability, breach of
express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent suppression. Id.
The defendants argued that the contract substantially affected interstate commerce because
Yarbrough Construction used national suppliers in the construction of the home. Id. The court
held that evidence that a party purchased equipment and materials from an in-state supplier, which
does business with or receives supplies or equipment from an out-of-state company, does not by
itself establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 3. In addition, the court held that
under the "come-to-rest" doctrine in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the flow in
interstate commerce ended when the materials or equipment reached the stores in Alabama
patronized by Yarbrough. Id. (citing Schechter, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935)). The reference to the
end of the flow of commerce shows that the court recognizes an alternative to the substantially
affects test. Had the court found that the flow of commerce had not ended, the court could have
found that the FAA applied.
91. See Am. Gen. Fin. v. Morton, 812 So. 2d 282 (Ala. 2001). In Morton, the court required a
substantial effect on interstate commerce after determining that the transaction did not involve the
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ment recruiting.92 It appears that the Supreme Court of Alabama uses
this approach more often than any other state. There is, however, at
least one Alabama case in which the court found that the FAA applied
under the Three Categories of Commerce Approach.
93
flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 286. Morton, an Alabama resident, sought compensatory and
punitive damages for breach of contract, fraudulent suppression, and fraudulent misrepresentation
based on his purchase of Alabama real estate from American General Finance, Inc., an Alabama
company. Id. at 283.
The court held that the FAA did not apply because the sale of real property in Alabama by an
Alabama company to a resident of Alabama is neither a transaction within the flow of interstate
commerce nor did the transaction have a substantial effect on interstate commerce under the
Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran test. Id. at 286. The court analyzed the five factors laid down
in Cochran and determined that the contract did not have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Id. at 288. Thus; the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The court also noted that
the Morton facts are different from the facts in Thompson v. Skipper Real Estate Co., 729 So. 2d
287, 290 (Ala. 1999), where the real estate purchase involved out-of-state financing, out-of-state
title insurance, and out-of-state homeowner's insurance. Id.
92. See Selma Med. Center, Inc. v. Fontenot, No. 1991793, 2001 WL 873615 (Ala. Aug. 3,
2001). In Fontenot, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's finding that the
defendant had not met its burden of demonstrating that the transactions at issue involved or had
any "substantial effect [on] interstate commerce." Id. at *1. The defendant, Selma Medical
Center, recruited two anesthesiology residents to relocate their medical practices from South
Carolina to Alabama. Id. The physicians agreed, each signing a "Recruiting Agreement" which
contained a provision obligating the hospital to pay the physicians $500,000 in gross cash receipts.
Id. However, if the physicians' net collectible revenue exceeded $500,000, the physicians would
repay the hospital the difference. Id. The hospital claimed, and the physicians disputed, that the
physicians owed it excess revenue. Id. The hospital then filed a demand for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association. Id. In response, the physicians filed a motion for stay of
arbitration, which the trial court granted based on the court's belief that the hospital's agreement
with the physicians was only intrastate in nature. Id. at *2.
The Supreme Court of Alabama overruled the lower court's decision holding that the
recruitment agreement was interstate in nature, satisfying the requirements of the FAA. Id. at *7.
The physicians argued that under Cochran, the agreements presented no "substantial impact" upon
interstate commerce that would render the FAA inapplicable. Id. at *5. The court held that the
physicians entered the flow of interstate commerce when they moved from South Carolina to
Alabama and that a substantial effect was not required where one of the other categories of the
Lopez decision was satisfied. Id. at *6. As such, the court stated,
[wihen a case involves allegation of the use of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, a court need not reach the
question whether the underlying transaction "substantially affects" interstate
commerce, because 'such persons and things, by definition, substantially affect -
because they are components of - interstate commerce.'
Id. at *5 (quoting Ex parte Stewart, 786 So. 2d 464, 474 (Ala. 2000)).
93. See Ex parte Stewart, 786 So. 2d 464, 467-69 (Ala. 2000). In Stewart, the Supreme Court
of Alabama upheld an order to compel arbitration. Id. at 469. Hugh Stewart and Kameron Hyde,
plaintiffs, were dealers of the Birmingham News, a newspaper published by The Birmingham
News Company (The News). Id. The News authorized the plaintiffs to act as exclusive
distributors of the newspaper in certain areas under a contract titled "Independent News Dealer
Agreement." Id. That agreement contained an arbitration provision. Id. at 466. Plaintiffs
brought suit after The News changed its distribution system and customer rating procedures,
thereby harming the plaintiffs. Id. The News filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial
court granted. Id. at 466-67. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to
vacate its order. Id.
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The most important case in this category is, predictably, from the
Alabama Supreme Court. In Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plas-
tering Company, the court discusses the definition of "involving com-
merce" in great detail.94 In Cochran, a Catholic religious order, the
Sisters of the Visitation, sued a contractor, Cochran, who the Sisters had
hired to make repairs on their chapel.95 Cochran moved to compel arbi-
tration under the contract for the repairs.96
The court began its analysis by recognizing that Lopez allows Con-
gress to regulate three categories of commerce: channels of commerce,
instrumentalities of commerce, and activities having a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.97
Then, the court commented on the Lopez decision's effect on the
Wickard case. It stated that an aggregate effects analysis, as used in
Wickard,98 should not be given too elastic an interpretation. Further-
more, the court held that in order for an economic activity to come
within the commerce power, the activity must substantially affect inter-
state commerce. 99 Because Wickard was not overruled by Lopez, how-
ever, the court analyzed whether the facts of Cochran satisfy the
Wickard standard. The court addressed this question by asking
whether the actions of an individual, which actions standing alone
would be considered "local" actions or actions with only an "indi-
rect" influence on interstate commerce, may be considered to have a
substantial influence on interstate commerce is to be determined by
considering how critical the regulation of all similarly situated per-
sons' activity is to the accomplishment of the primary purpose of a
statute drawn to regulate an activity clearly having a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.' °°
The court also expressed concern that an overly expansive application of
the FAA would "defeat the doctrine of federalism."' 00
The News presented evidence that virtually all of the inserts contained in the newspaper,
including advertisements for national retail chains, are prepared, printed, and shipped to The News
from out-of-state companies. The News also presented evidence showing that a significant
portion of its news content and pictures derived from out-of-state agreements with other news
services, including the Associated Press, Universal Press, Knight Ridder Tribune, and King
Features. Id. at 467-68. The court held that the distribution of the newspapers by Stewart and
Hyde was part of the flow of interstate commerce and that the flow of commerce had not ended
upon delivery of the inserts, news, and pictures sent to The News by out-of-state companies. Id. at
468-69.
94. 775 So. 2d. 759 (Ala. 2000).
95. Id. at 760.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 761.
98. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
99. Id. at 760-61.
100. Id. at 764.
101. Id. at 765.
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The court found that if the Cochran facts fall under any prong of
Lopez, they fall under the Substantial Affects prong. 10 2 Then, the court
developed five criteria to help determine whether a situation has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. First, the court analyzed the citi-
zenship of'the parties and stated that the transaction involved two local
parties unaffiliated with interstate commerce.10 3  Second, the court
looked at the tools and equipment used and determined that regardless of
whether Cochran acquired tools and equipment in interstate commerce,
there was no substantial effect based on this prong. 10 4 Next, the court
assessed the cost allocation of services and materials, stating that there
was no evidence that the contract affected interstate commerce by way
of a "dependence upon materials and services moving in interstate com-
merce."' 1 5 Then, the court asked whether the actors' subsequent move-
ment across state lines could create a substantial effect on interstate
commerce and determined that the restoration project was incapable of
subsequent movement across state lines.'0 6 Lastly, the court looked at
the degree of separablitity from other contracts and found that even
though the Sisters' contract with Cochran was connected with many
other contracts that may have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce, that fact alone is not determinative.1
0 7
VI. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS GET IT RIGHT
Generally, the lower federal courts correctly apply the joint rule
created by Lopez and Allied-Bruce Terminix cases. 0 8 While these
courts require that the facts of a case satisfy one of the three categories
of commerce created by the Lopez Court, they realistically apply the rule
to the facts in the case at hand. They recognize that while there are
limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power, those limits are reached
in only the most extreme situations.
The District of Connecticut correctly applied both rules in Cos-
motek Mumessillik ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketi v. Cosmotek USA. 109 There,
the court stated that to determine whether the FAA applies, a three-
102. Id. at 764.
103. Id. at 765.
104. Id. at 766.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 767.
108. But see Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
109. 942 F. Supp. 757 (D. Conn. 1996). There, Cosmotek USA entered into a contract with
Ticaret Limited Sirkketi whereby Sirkketi became Cosmotek's distributor and sales representative
for the sale of Fitch Catalyst units. Id. at 759. Advance Power Systems (APSI) manufactured the
catalyst units. Id. While the contract between Cosmotek and Sirkketi contained an agreement by
the parties to arbitrate future disputes, APSI was not a party to that contract. Id. at 760. When a
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prong test must be satisfied: (1) there must be a written arbitration agree-
ment; (2) federal jurisdiction must be proper and independent of the
FAA; and (3) the underlying transaction must involve interstate com-
merce.' 1° Because the facts of this case did not satisfy the first prong of
the test, the court did not examine the commerce requirement beyond
stating that interstate commerce must be involved in order for the FAA
to apply. " '
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
faced the task of combining the Lopez and Allied-Bruce holdings in
Roadway Package Systems, Inc. v. Kayser."12 In Kayser, the circuit
court affirmed the lower court, holding that the FAA applied despite the
existence of the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act.' '3 The court
stated that the FAA should apply in Kayser because the contract at issue
contained an agreement to arbitrate between citizens of different states
and involved the "delivery and pick-up of packages that have been or
will be shipped interstate."'"' The court stated that in this situation, the
agreement was "unquestionably within Congress' power to reach under
the Commerce Clause."' '5 Here, the court recognized that the FAA
applies because the law falls within two of the areas where Congress
may regulate commerce, namely the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce." 16
VII. CONCLUSION
Though the Supreme Court began its decision in Lopez with a
strong quote by James Madison claiming that the federal government's
powers are "few and defined," for the Supreme Court to hold that Con-
gress has exceeded its Commerce Clause powers, Congress must enact
extreme legislation with no "sort of economic enterprise" or no "essen-
dispute arose, the plaintiff argued that the state law applied, rather than the FAA, because APSI
was not a party to the contract. Id.
110. Id. at 759.
111. Id. at 759-60.
112. 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. Pa. 2001). There, Roadway Package System, Inc. (RPS), shipped
small packages for corporate clients. Id. at 288. Independent contractors, such as the defendant,
aided in shipping the packages. Id. Roadway fired Kayser and alleged that he failed to meet his
obligations under the Linehaul Contractor Operating Agreement (LCOA), which governed their
business dealings. Id. at 289. Kayser demanded arbitration, as was his right under the LCOA, and
won an award. Id. at 290. RPS then asked the court to vacate the award. Id. at 291. The district
court complied, applying the vacatur standards set forth in the FAA on the grounds that the
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority. Id.
113. Id. at 289.
114. Id. at 291.
115. Id. at 291-92.
116. See id. at 292.
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tial part of a larger regulation or economic activity."' 7 This is an
extremely loose test that can be easily fulfilled. Although courts should
require that one of the three categories of commerce be met before
applying the FAA, the courts should realize that this is no high hurdle.
Where a contract containing an arbitration clause involves any form of
interstate commerce, even in the aggregate, the Supreme Court would
likely find that the FAA applies.
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